BREDOLAB: shopping in the cybercrime underworld by de Graaf, Daan et al.
BREDOLAB: Shopping in the Cybercrime Underworld 
Daan de Graaf1, Ahmed F.Shosha2 and Pavel Gladyshev2 
1National High Tech Crime Unit, Netherlands' Police Agency, the Netherlands 
Daan.De.Graaf@nhtcu.nl 
2University College Dublin, Ireland 
Ahmed.Shosha@ucdconnect.ie and Pavel.Gladyshev@ucd.ie 
Abstract. A recent emerging trend in the underground economy is malware 
dissemination as a service. Complex botnet infrastructures are developed to 
spread and install malware for third-party customers. In this research work, a 
botnet forensic investigation model is proposed to investigate and analyze 
large-scale botnets. The proposed investigation model is applied to a real-world 
law-enforcement investigation case that involves investigation of a large-scale 
malware dissemination botnet called BredoLab. The results of the forensic 
investigation show the effectiveness of the proposed model in assisting law-
enforcement to conduct a successful forensic analysis of BredoLab botnet and 
its related resources.  
Keywords: BredoLab, Botnets, Law-Enforcement Investigations, Malware 
Forensics, Forensic Investigation Models. 
1   Introduction 
Over the past few years, cybercrimes on the Internet have gradually transformed to 
profit-based crimes. A complex underground economy has emerged with complex 
divisions to manage various cybercriminal activities, e.g. financial crimes on the 
Internet, identity theft, attacking online services and dissemination of suspicious 
services, i.e. spam and phishing distribution. These illegal activities are supported 
with a solid networking infrastructure, such as bulletproof hosting through Virtual 
Private Network (VPN), to provide the cybercriminals a quality control and 
management for their malicious activities.  
To manage the underground economy, well-defined organizations are established 
to rule the economic and technical aspects of the malicious service delivery through 
professional roles, such as, carders, scammers, financial cashiers, malware authors, 
spammers, spoof-website designers, money launders and botherders [1]. These 
organizations provide fee-based services on behalf of third-party customers to commit 
the customers’ required criminal activities. In essence, these illegal services are 
mostly advertised on communication forums that are denoted as “Underground 
Forums” [2]. Such forums provide a secure communication channel between 
malicious services’ providers and the services’ customers through providing an 
infrastructure, e.g. communication-based dashboard to manage requested services and 
to advertise newly developed malicious services. To commit previously 
aforementioned illegal acts, cybercriminals are usually assisted with botnets.  A 
botnet is a collection of infected computers connected to the Internet and controlled 
by a botnet commander, usually denoted as bot-herder, and utilized to commit wide 
variety of cybercrimes, such as denial of Internet-based services [3]. 
As a bot controller, the bot-herder possesses the ability to download, update and 
execute malicious binaries on infected systems [3-4]. Fundamentally, he/she utilizes 
this functionality to update installed bots on the victim’s computer with a newly 
developed malware sample, to allow execution of new binaries determined to commit 
different malicious activities. This process is denoted as “malware downloader” and 
describes the ability of a certain botnet to install other malware samples for different 
purposes. Since malware downloading is an important resource in botnets, bot-herders 
may offer the resource as a fee-based service to other cybercriminals.  As a result, a 
cybercriminal use such paid service to commit a specific crime, i.e. malware 
downloader for banking fraud. A complex example of a botnet that was specifically 
used to offer the bots resources for spam activities and bank fraud is BredoLab.  
Researchers and anti-virus companies first saw the BredoLab botnet in 2009. It is a 
complex downloading platform designed to facilitate malware spread on a massive, 
large-scale rate and used as fee-based service for installing malware to third-parties 
customers who could use infected machines (bots) to commit various cybercriminal 
activities.   
From July 2010 till October 2010 the National High Tech Crime Unit of the 
Netherlands' Police Agency (NHTCU) did an investigation to a specific BredoLab 
botnet. The investigation has estimated that initial size of the botnet is, at least, three 
million infected machines. Following the investigation, NHTCU discovered that the 
networking infrastructure of this BredoLab botnet was running at a large-scale hosting 
provider in the Netherlands. Thus, on October 25, 2010 the NHTCU successfully took 
over the control of a BredoLab botnet and got access to servers that were directly 
connected to the network. 
 Because of the large-scale nature of BredoLab, traditional forensics investigation 
models were not sufficient to investigate and analyze the bot’s resources. A forensics 
investigation model to investigate large-scale botnets was required.     
In this research paper, a large-scale botnet’s forensic investigation approach is 
proposed to analyze the botnet infrastructure. The proposed approach is applied in a 
real-world law-enforcement investigation of a BredoLab botnet. Finally, an analysis 
on BredoLab’s resources is conducted to provide practical insights on the 
investigation of the malware selling botnets.  
 
Paper Organization. Section two presents the proposed approach to forensically 
investigate large-scale botnets. Section three presents a case study of a law-
enforcement investigation on the BredoLab botnet. Section four presents a research 
on the botnet data. Finally, section five concludes the paper. 
2   An Approach to Analyze Large-Scale Centralized Botnets  
Various forensic analysis and investigation approaches are proposed to analyze 
botnets, and investigate the underground economies. Most of currently proposed 
approaches, however, are limited to the analysis of malware samples found in 
acquired botnets, or focus on analysis of the communication channels to/from the 
cybercriminals. A comprehensive forensic investigation model to investigate large-
scale infrastructure of botnets, however, is still missing.   
In this section, we describe the infrastructure model commonly employed in 
centralized large-scale botnets, and propose a forensic investigation model to analyze 
the infrastructure. Note that, illustrated infrastructure is based on a real-world 
investigation case of a BredoLab botnet.   
Generally, larges-scale botnets are comprised of several working components, each 
of which is designated to one or more predefined functionalities. For example, main 
modules in a large-scale botnet such as BredoLab encompass C&C (Command and 
Control) servers, databases servers, bot-herder administration panels and customer 
control panels. The understanding of each module and the interrelationship between 
instances of each module is crucial for forensic investigation of the botnet’s activities 
and is required for the proper disassembly of the botnet threats.    
From a forensic investigation point of view, successful investigative model has to 
consider the modular nature of a botnet under investigation. Otherwise, investigation 
of interactions between the botnet’s modules may conclude to insufficient results. As 
a result, the proposed botnet investigation model is decomposed into a set of 
subcomponents; each component is designated to investigate one or more specific 
module in the botnet’s infrastructure. Note that, proposed model can be used when the 
botnet is identified and its servers are located.  
In the proposed approach, three main investigation stages are defined to analyze 
the botnet’s resources. The first stage includes forensic acquisition of the botnet’s 
resources, i.e. forensic imaging of botnet hosting servers, etc. The second stage 
includes forensic evidence and data extraction of acquired forensic images and 
communication networks. Finally, the third stage includes analysis of malware 
samples found in botnet resources. A detailed analysis of the botnet backend and the 
re-building of the botnet infrastructure in a controlled environment to reconstruct a 
full view of the botnet resources is, also, proposed. This allows precise understating 
of the botnet threats.  
As shown in figure 1, wiretap and net-flow components are designed to allow the 
acquisition of sampled network data from the botnet’s communication. The analysis 
of botnet network data is essential to identify how the botnet modules are interacting 
and communicating with each other, which facilitates forensic investigation of 
interrelated modules. Forensic acquisition of the botnet’s infrastructure, when the 
botnet is taken down, is accomplished using the forensic images component. This 
process includes forensic analysis of the images to extract forensic evidences and 
information to continue investigation, such as, botnet administrations and customers 
panels’ related information, information about C&C servers, bots’ database and 
downloader malware module. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Large-Scale Botnet Forensic Investigation Model.  
 
Based on extracted evidence from acquired forensic images a detailed behavior 
analysis of botnets resources, such as, malware samples behavior is required.   
Determining the behavior of malware samples extracted from the botnet 
downloader database is accomplished through a dynamic malware analysis 
component. Practically, malware analysis component is a preconfigured controlled 
dynamic malware analysis environment [5-6] that is used to determine the behavior of 
malware samples used in botnets. The behavior analysis of malware samples includes 
identification of actions and activities invoked by the sample in infected bots, security 
assessment of used exploitation payload and spreading mechanism used by malware 
sample, and method used to hide their presence in infected bots, and techniques used 
to ensure persistence.  Finally, to ensure that valid forensic investigation conclusions 
are resulted, a full forensic analysis based on re-building the botnet’s resources in a 
controlled environment is developed. The workflow of service provided by the botnet 
is traced in the managed environment and are matched to conclusions resulting from 
the investigation to ensure validity and integrity of the conclusions.    
3   Case Study: BredoLab Botnet Investigation 
The first BredoLab exploits where seen in May 2009 by anti-virus companies [7-
8]. The initial analysis of BredoLab reveals a complex threat posed by the botnet as 
results of employing different sophisticated attack vectors implemented in various 
malware samples. Particularly, BredoLab can install a wide range of malware 
families, e.g. password stealers, rootkits, backdoors, banking trojans, fake anti-virus 
software and spam malware [8].  
In this section, a case study is provided about law-enforcement investigation of a 
BredoLab botnet. The case study includes procedures used to disassemble the botnet’s 
threat and detailed forensic analysis on data extracted from the botnet for forensic 
investigation purposes based on the previously presented forensic investigation 
model. 
3.1   NHTCU Investigation  
Leaseweb, a large hosting provider located in the Netherlands, started in 2010 with 
the Community Outreach Project [9]. This project offers free servers and bandwidth 
in support to the organizations that monitor, identify and combat the sources of spam 
and crime on the Internet. One of the participants in the project is Abuse.ch, a non-
profit organization that analyses different threats on the Internet, such as, Zeus and 
SpyEye [10]. Through Abuse.ch, Leaseweb was informed about a possible large-scale 
botnet infrastructure that intersects with their network, since Zeus malware was one of 
the malware samples spread by BredoLab. Normally, the regular security process of 
Leaseweb encompasses the immediate interaction with the servers’ disseminating 
malware and blocking all communication channels. Instead, due to the large-scale 
nature of discovered botnet, Leaseweb decided to involve the National High Tech 
Crime Unit of the Netherlands' Police Agency (NHTCU) for further tracking of the 
botnet’s resources. Initially, NHTCU acquired the net-flow data from the servers at 
Leaseweb for further network forensic analysis and investigation. Furthermore, the 
NHTCU placed additional wiretaps on eleven servers at Leaseweb to control the 
network communication involving BredoLab bots with a total amount of acquired 
wiretap data equals to four terabyte. 
 
During the investigation, different malicious servers were fully identified as 
followed: 
• A malware management server that used to hack and distribute newly 
developed malware samples. 
• FTP grabber server used to authenticate credentials used by malware and 
distributed by the BredoLab botnet. 
• A VPN server used for different purposes, such as, management of other 
servers, hacks to new proxy servers, Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks and 
communication with partners and personal customers. 
• A database server used to store information about infected bots and malware 
samples distributed by the BredoLab botnet. 
• A Jabber server to communicate with various malware samples i.e. 
commands to Zeus malware.  
• Various C&C servers to control the bots. 
 
In most adversarial legal systems, to establish a valid accusation, forensic analysts 
are required to prove that accused person has a knowledge and control - or what so-
called “mens rea”1- based on evidence and artifacts extracted from case under 
investigation. In the BredoLab investigation, forensic evidence that establish the 
knowledge and control of the criminal activity using BredoLab is obtained from the 
wiretaps of the database server and the VPN server. Various forensic evidence and 
supporting artifacts, such as, evidence to identify the botnet owners and customers, 
traces of malware distribution for different purposes, evidence about launching DDoS 
attacks and hacking into various websites, are successfully collected during 
                                                            
1 Mens rea is Latin for "guilty mind". In criminal law, it is viewed as one of the necessary 
elements of a crime. 
investigation based on wiretapping investigated servers and the analyses of the 
network traffic to/from identified servers. 
3.2 BredoLab Botnet Termination Procedures  
On October 25, 2010, BredoLab infrastructure was terminated and taken offline. 
The NHTCU successfully connected to the backend panel located on one of the C&C 
servers through exploiting a cookie extracted from wiretap artifacts of the VPN 
server. After controlling the backend panel, the NHTCU terminated all malicious 
activity, i.e. active malware distributions tasks. Intuitively, this action will only 
contribute to limit infecting new computers; however, to disrupt the ability of 
BredoLab, further actions are required to disinfect previously infected bots. Thus, 
NHTCU developed a program that is uploaded to all bots in the network and launched 
a standard browser on the victims’ computers to allow infected users to read a press-
warning message. This warning message has been viewed over 300,000 times.  
BredoLab botnet was let active for a few days in order to reach as much victims as 
possible. After that, the network connections to all servers were terminated. Suspect 
servers where confiscated for further forensic investigation by the NHTCU. 
Additionally, suspect IP’s, domain names and malware found during the investigation 
were distributed to the professional security communities. 
During the investigation, the bot-herder was identified as results of wiretap data 
analysis of the VPN server, since the suspect bot-herder used to use the VPN server 
for other non-criminal activities, such as: accessing his personal Facebook account, e-
mail accounts, and his WebMoney accounts. The NHTCU made an international 
arrest warrant, through which the suspect got arrested a few days later at the airport of 
Yerevan, Armenia. The suspect got convicted in Armenia for four years, based on the 
information provided by the NHTCU.  
4   Analysis of BredoLab’s Resources and Infrastructure  
BredoLab resources’ analysis and forensic investigation is accomplished using the 
forensic investigation model described earlier. Thus, in this section, the analysis’s 
results of the different BredoLab resources, such as, the network data acquired from 
the communication infrastructure and the layout of the network used in a BredoLab 
botnet is presented. To reconstruct the network layout, a sampling of the wiretap data 
was captured and interrelation between captured network packets was reconstructed 
using a custom-built wiretap analysis tools developed by the NHTCU [11].  Each 
sampled data packet consists of: source and destination IP addresses, used networking 
protocol, source and destination port numbers. The sampled packets are correlated 
together to determine the communication network layout used to maintain BredoLab 
services. As shown in figure 2, when sampled network data are correlated together, 
the BredoLab network infrastructure layout can be identified.   
Figure 2: The BredoLab Infrastructure Layout. 
 
The BredoLab infrastructure consisted of: a database server, a central proxy server, 
several proxies installed on bots, a backend server, a personal hacking server, a VPN 
server and several C&C servers. The blue square contains the servers that were 
wiretapped at Leaseweb. The red lines are traffic generated by the administrator from 
the VPN server. The data created by the previously mentioned wiretap analysis tools 
showed that all the traffic from the three C&C servers consists of: HTTP traffic going 
to a main proxy server in France, and plain MySQL code going to one central 
database server. The database server was used, as well, by one of the installed 
malware as FTPgrabber malware.  Forensic investigation also showed that the VPN 
server has several encrypted connections to a suspect IP addresses in Armenia and 
was used to manage other servers.  
4.1   Wiretap Data Analysis 
     Based on determined BredoLab’s communication network infrastructure layout, 
three main C&C servers were identified as active servers. Forensic investigation of 
these servers’ wiretaps revealed communication traffic to a domain called 
“worldhostdns.com”. Further investigations resulted in specified domain is resolve to 
an IP address of a C&C server through a proxy server that is located in France. 
Analysis of wiretap data has, additionally, revealed that communication between 
infected bots and suspect domain is accomplished through various HTTP requests to a 
web page named “controller.php”.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A sample Communication Packet to a C&C Server. 
In essence, the communication to the C&C server through “controller.php”, as 
shown in figure 3, is defined in the following steps [8]: 
• The infected bots connect to the suspect C&C server to update its infection 
status and to download newly developed malware through a GET request. 
Whereas, the C&C server could identify if connected host is an authorized 
bot, if the “Action” parameter in GET request is set “Bot”.  
• The C&C server responds to communicate bots with a response message 
containing malware samples needed to install. 
• The bot replies back if a malware installation task was handled successfully 
or not through specific GET request in which “Action” parameter is set to 
“Report”. Additionally, infected bots alert the server with the task starting 
timestamp via “Unique_Start” parameter. 
• Finally, the C&C server reports back with an acknowledgement message. 
4.2   Backend Panels Forensic Analysis 
Forensic investigation of BredoLab’s network has identified two different backend 
panels; one is located on a separate backend server, and the other is located on the 
database server. The backend panel is called “BM Tx Edition v1.5.1.”  such 
that, BM is abbreviation for BredoLab Manager. The Tx and the version numbering is 
a reference to installed BredoLab’s software version. Identified panels are developed 
in PHP and are used to manage different tasks, like: activate malware orders, 
start/stop of malware tasks, and manage installing and cleaning of malware. Besides 
management activities, the backend panels also maintain statistics about installed 
malware and infected bots. Below is a snapshot sample for information presented in a 
backend panel. 
 
192.168.1.101 - - [06/Sep/2011:17:17:16 +0200] 
"GEThttp://worldhostdns.com/new/controller.php?actio
n=bot&entity_list=1272705710,1272796684,127875990,12
81608998,1283317892&first=0&rnd=981633&uid=1&guid=29
47510467   HTTP/1.0" - - "-" "-" 
 
192.168.1.101 -- [06/Sep/2011:21:29:32 +0200] " GET 
http://worldhostdns.com/new/controller.php?action=re
port&uid=1&guid=3985971469&rnd=123&entity=1259351490
:unique_start;1259970379:unique_start;1271368047:uni
que_start;1278753990:unique_start;1283419228:unique_
start;1283685805:unique_start    HTTP/1.0" - - "-" 
"-" 
 
 
Figure 4: BredoLab Sample Backend Panel. 
 
An additional important panel is BredoLab’s customers and partners mangement 
panel. Customers’ panel which is resident in the database server was used to upload 
malware samples and to define prefered number of computers to be infected. Once a 
malware is uploaded through the panel, malware spread task is activated on the main 
backend panel and then malware is being dissemenated. Finally, the panel, as well, 
keeps tracks of open payments and customer related information.  
4.4   BredoLab Database Analysis 
       During post-mortem forensic investigation of the acquired servers’ forensic 
images, a BredoLab malware database was successfully extracted. Database forensic 
investigation has showed that a database named “BM” is used to store information 
about infected bots and different malware samples. Fundamentally, a number of 
essential database tables to assist BredoLab service delivery are identified as follow:  
 
• Malware tasks: A table referencing stored information about infected bots 
and stored malware to manage outstanding malware infections tasks. 
• Bots: A table to store the infected bots information. 
• Users: A table that stores information about users and customers who are 
controlling the botnet.  
• An administration table that is used by the backend panel and various C&C 
servers to assist the BredoLab administrator to control service requests, and 
payments from customers.  
 
Tasks related to malware activities in the database are divided into two 
components; a component that is designated to malware management while the other 
is for statistics operations. The management component assists in 1) Upload new 
malware and place it directly in the database as BLOB file, 2) Set country and 
regional variables to the location in which malware should be deployed, 3) Pause, 
load or reload spreading of a malware. While the statistics component, on the other 
side, is used to draw malware dissemination graphs, illustrate spread rates and spread 
dates in the backend panel. Every bot that is infected with a certain malware task gets 
stored in the statistics table. And for every infection, the backend panel kept track of 
IP address of the infected machine, date and timestamp of infection, and country and 
region. 
The acquired statistics table contained information about 3,283,644 infected bots 
with 38 different malware tasks. However, the table counts, only, unique IP addresses. 
Hence, total infected IP addresses were 477,282 with the 38 different malware tasks. 
Note that, this number does not define the actual size of the BredoLab botnet, since it 
is possible that bots do not have active tasks at the database acquisition time.  
Additionally, the wiretap from law-enforcement investigation of a C&C server 
showed that in a month, over one million infected unique IP addresses were 
identified. Thus, aforementioned statistics present a challenge in determining the 
actual size of a BredoLab botnet.  Two tables in the investigated database are linked 
directly to the bots and loaders of BredoLab. These tables are used to assist 
monitoring of active infections of BredoLab via tracking information, such as: 
timestamps of infection and date of last connection to a C&C server, IP address, 
country, region and the infected bot GUID. The GUID resembles the serial number of 
the hard-drive where BredoLab residents. An administration table called 
“admtasks” is, also, identified and is used by the main backend panel and in the 
administration panel. The “admtasks” table is linked to the earlier mentioned 
malware tasks. “Admtasks” is a principal table in administrating active malware 
tasks and tracking customer information to every task. This includes, customer name, 
ICQ number of the customer, if found, and all payment details. 
A number of 331 malware files dated from July 2009 till October 2010 are 
extracted from the “admtasks” table. Extracted malware files were tested using 
VTest software in cooperation with Norman IT Security [12]. VTest was recognizing 
96% of extracted malware in the database.  
Below, are a few examples of the malware samples being used in BredoLab: 
• Eighteen malware files were recognized by as Tedroo. Tedroo is known as a 
malware that is being used to spread spam. 
• Nine malware files were being recognized as Zeus or ZBot malware. Zeus is 
a well-known malware family that is being used for banking cybercrimes.  
• More than twenty malware files were recognized as being a fake Anti-Virus 
program. Fake A/V are used to mislead users into paying money for fake 
Anti-Virus products. 
• Eight files were recognized as BredoLab malware or BredoLab variants.  
5   Conclusion and Discussion 
Downloader botnets pose a significant challenge to the user and computer security 
on Internet. A prevalent example of downloader botnet is BredoLab. Although, a 
significant effort to contain BredoLab’s threats by security community and law-
enforcement is spent, recent researches showed that BredoLab and its variants are still 
widely spread. Moreover, complex infection and spreading techniques that are found 
only in BredoLab malware samples are, unfortunately, now employed in other major 
malware families [13-14].  
To this end, this practical research paper presented a large-scale forensic 
investigation model that is applied to BredoLab botnet investigation. The proposed 
model suggested different forensic investigation components to analyze the botnets 
resources and to extract necessary evidence to assist law enforcement. Furthermore, 
the paper illustrated the law enforcement procedures to forensically acquire and 
investigate BredoLab, and to develop required knowledge and control to support 
prosecution using proposed model. Most take-downs take months or even years of 
research to attempt a take-down [14,15]. In the case of the Bredolab investigation a 
wiretap on the VPN server from the main suspect proved to be enough to get the data 
needed to take-down the botnet and start prosecution. A combination of research in 
the security community together with law-enforcement might prove the best way to 
attack these kinds of botnets in the future. 
Our future work includes, enhancement to the presented model and integration of 
security-related research with law-enforcement procedures to provide better 
countermeasures to cybercrime threats. 
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